Following a four-year moratorium on the repatriation of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Indonesia is reportedly considering resuming the repatriation of its citizens from Syria’s Al-Hol and Roj camps. Approximately 529 Indonesians are believed to be living in the two camps, primarily women and children.
In May 2024, the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency submitted a proposal to then president Joko Widodo for the repatriation of Indonesian ex-ISIS members from Syria. This follows years of preparation by the Foreign Terrorist Fighters taskforce — a unit of 15 government agencies — that was formed by the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs in 2021 and rejuvenated in 2023.
The repatriation proposal consists of three phases — before the border, at the border and after the border. The first phase involves identity and data verification of Indonesians in Syrian camps. Then at the border, returning Indonesians will be assessed for medical and psychological conditions, radicalisation and threat risk. After the border, individuals will be prosecuted for any charges related to their case and, in the absence of such charges, will be sent to a rehabilitation centre before reintegration into society.
Repatriation will prioritise children, women and elderly men. Though this still leaves many ex-ISIS Indonesians in Syria, it is a significant improvement from the 2020 policy which restricted repatriation to orphans under 10 years old in Syria and arranged for them to return on an ad hoc basis. The exclusivity and informality of this policy resulted in the repatriation of only four children from Syrian camps between 2020 and 2023.
Three factors make the case for repatriation more favourable now — a sympathetic political climate, Indonesia’s readiness to receive the returnees and long-term security considerations.
Both the domestic and international political climates lend themselves to the establishment of a repatriation program. While former Indonesian president Joko Widodo was against repatriation, the newly-elected President Prabowo Subianto said that he supported the repatriation of ex-ISIS Indonesians as long as the returnees have their identities verified and are investigated to ensure they do not pose a significant security risk. Indonesia has made considerable progress in this regard — at least 375 Indonesians have been located and assessed as in need of repatriation in the two Syrian camps, among them 145 children.
Internationally, Indonesia faces increasing pressure from the international community to rescue its citizens from the deplorable living conditions in the Al-Hol and Roj camps.
The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported in March 2024 that Indonesia is among 35 countries that have made no effort to repatriate children with foreign citizenship held in northeast Syria. In May 2024, the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency Inspector General of Police, Ibnu Suhendra, admitted that of all countries that had citizens travel to Syria to join ISIS, Indonesia is one of only three countries that have yet to repatriate their citizens, highlighting the urgency for action.
Indonesia is much better equipped to handle returnees now compared to just a few years ago. The 2020 moratorium was implemented after Indonesia’s disastrous experience handling the first batch of returnees in 2017, which was unsurprising given there was no ‘systematic or planned reintegration process’.
At the time of the first returnees’ arrival in 2017, the designated rehabilitation centre, Sentra Handayani, had no experience working with radicalised individuals as it was designed to be a shelter for juvenile offenders and child victims of violence. There was no mechanism to structure the rehabilitation process according to the unique needs of formerly radicalised children returning from conflict zones. Consequently, recidivism occurred, including the notorious case of Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani — a couple who had been briefly placed in Sentra Handayani before conducting a suicide bombing in the Philippines in January 2019.
Indonesia’s deradicalisation and rehabilitation infrastructure has improved considerably since 2019. Sentra Handayani now has a standard operational procedure for handling ‘child victims of radicalism’. Stakeholders involved in the repatriation process, including civil society organisations, social workers, psychologists and government workers, have also undergone various capacity-building programs to better handle cases of violent extremism.
Indonesia’s approach to preventing and countering violent extremism has also expanded. The newly implemented National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN PE) empowers local governments to establish action plans for preventing extremism, increasing awareness and community resilience. This is especially beneficial for long-term monitoring when returnees are sent back to their hometowns across Indonesia.
Importantly, RAN PE itself is a product of strengthened coordination between the government and civil society organisations with a Thematic Working Group which has actively involved civil society organisations in the formulation, advocacy and implementation of RAN PE. This collaboration allows stakeholders to leverage each other’s assets in preparation for handling returnees.
It is also in Indonesia’s security interest to repatriate children from internment camps in Syria as soon as possible, else they become further radicalised and potentially recruited by militant groups.
Many children currently stuck in Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps were either unaware that they were being brought to Syria and for what reason or have since become disillusioned with the promises of extremist groups and wish to return. According to field research by Julie Chernov-Hwang, a sense of both disillusionment and perceived costs outweighing the benefits of involvement with extremist groups is necessary for individuals to make the decision to disengage from terrorism.
Access to an alternative social network is essential for successful disengagement from terrorism. It is imperative to bring individuals, especially children, back to Indonesia before they get recruited by terror networks. It is well-documented that ISIS grooms children to commit combat and suicide attacks in their name. In 2022, there were reports that Indonesian members of ISIS living in Al-Hol camp had smuggled children out of the camp to join ISIS as new recruits.
Without effective repatriation and rehabilitation policies, Indonesian children stuck in Syria risk becoming entrenched in terror networks like ISIS. Indonesians indoctrinated to subscribe to extremist ideologies and who possess advanced weapons training, could pose a significant threat to Indonesia, especially if ISIS or other militant groups resurge in the region, which is more likely following the collapse of the Ba’athist regime in Syria.
The risks associated with repatriating ex-ISIS Indonesians cannot be eliminated entirely. But Indonesia has sufficient resources and has learnt from experience to better manage such risks.
Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
